Tag Archives: Bear Stearns

Former Bear Stearns Executives Seemingly Unscathed By Financial Crisis They Helped Trigger

By The Huffington Post News Editors

Before Lehman crashed, there was “The Bear.”

Bear Stearns, once the nation’s fifth-largest investment bank, had been a fixture on Wall Street since 1923 and had survived the crash of 1929 without laying off any employees.

But in 2008, its customers and creditors didn’t much care about its storied history. They were worried that the billions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities on its books weren’t worth what the company claimed. En masse, they stopped doing business with Bear.

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Source: FULL ARTICLE at Huffington Post

JPMorgan Earnings: An Early Look

By Dan Caplinger, The Motley Fool

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Earnings season has begun, and on Friday JPMorgan Chase will release its latest quarterly results. The key to making smart investment decisions on stocks reporting earnings is to anticipate how they’ll do before they announce results, leaving you fully prepared to respond quickly to whatever inevitable surprises arise. That way you’ll be less likely to make an uninformed, knee-jerk decision.

As a key financial stock in the Dow Jones Industrial Average , JPMorgan has held up reasonably well in the aftermath of the financial crisis, but it has also suffered some high-profile problems, most notably the infamous “London Whale” trading debacle that cost the bank billions of dollars. Can the JPMorgan stay on the road to a full recovery? Let’s take an early look at what’s been happening with JPMorgan over the past quarter and what we’re likely to see in its quarterly report.

Stats on JPMorgan

Analyst EPS Estimate

$1.39

Change From Year-Ago EPS

17%

Revenue Estimate

$25.94 billion

Change From Year-Ago Revenue

(5.4%)

Earnings Beats in Past 4 Quarters

4

Source: Yahoo! Finance.

Can you bank on JPMorgan this quarter?
In recent months, analysts have gotten a lot more bullish on JPMorgan’s earnings prospects. They’ve boosted their earnings estimates for the just-ended quarter by a nickel per share and raised their full-year 2013 projections by an even more substantial $0.17 per share. The stock has performed well in response, with a 10% gain since early January.

JPMorgan has grown much healthier since the days of the financial crisis. In JPMorgan’s stress test results last month, the bank got approval from the Federal Reserve to boost its dividend by more than 25% and buy back $6 billion in shares in the next year. In a minor setback, the Fed’s approval was conditional on the bank’s improving its capital plan to strengthen its planning procedures. Yet JPMorgan is still well ahead of Bank of America and Citigroup in their respective recoveries. For their part, B of A and Citigroup chose not to pursue a dividend increase despite their greatly improved capital conditions, leaving their investors stuck at a $0.01 per-share quarterly payout.

JPMorgan has been doing its best to put its past difficulties behind it. Earlier this month, the bank had the bulk of the claims against it thrown out of court in connection with mortgage-backed securities that JPMorgan had sold to European bank Dexia. It also came to a settlement in the MF Global case worth more than $500 million, which will go a long way toward restoring customers’ lost account balances in the debacle. Even with ongoing liability from its acquisition of Bear Stearns in 2008, JPMorgan has moved ahead in reducing its potential outlays in the future.

Perhaps the biggest liability break came from the dismissal of lawsuits surrounding last year’s LIBOR scandal. Although JPMorgan would

Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

Why JPMorgan Needs Jamie Dimon in Both Roles

By John Grgurich, The Motley Fool

Filed under:

Over the weekend, news got out that JPMorgan Chase‘s board of directors was actively lobbying its largest shareholders to keep Jamie Dimon in his dual roles of chief executive officer and chairman: This in the wake of growing discontent over how Dimon handled last year’s London Whale trading incident, and in response to a shareholder proposal to separate the roles of CEO and COB.

Though I normally argue the opposite, in this situation, the board is absolutely right, and is on the side of investors.

The case against the same person as CEO and COB
The pitch I’m used to making goes something like this: CEOs in any business are the top dogs, essentially dictators. Their word is typically the final word on all things.

Ideally, of course, these dictators are open-minded people whose egos are in enough natural check to not only hire smart people to advise them, but to actually listen to them, as well. This is the “benevolent king” model. But because absolute power can corrupt absolutely, this model doesn’t always work out.

So, corporations have boards of directors, which are headed by chairmen. Because chairmen of the board (COBs) — in concert with the boards — have the power to hire and fire CEOs, they’re in the ideal position to check the absolute power of CEOs who have run amok.

On a less menacing note, an independent chair can also offer CEOs unfiltered and perhaps even uncomfortable advice on running the business they might not get from underlings who fear that speaking their minds may cost them their jobs.

Theoretically, then, separating the roles of CEO and COB should make a business healthier and more profitable.

The case for Jamie Dimon in both roles
It’s an old argument, and possibly a dangerous one, but I’m going to make it anyway: Jamie Dimon is so good at what he does, that the benefits of him simultaneously occupying the positions of CEO and COB outweigh the potential dangers.

Dimon became president and chief operating officer at JPMorgan Chase when the superbank merged with Bank One in 2004, where Dimon had been also been CEO and COB. He became CEO at JPMorgan in 2005, and COB in 2006. It was those middle years of the 2000s — when the most dangerous part of the housing bubble formed — that Dimon proved his mettle as the bank’s leader.

As qualified homebuyers began to run out, banks turned to unqualified applicants — or subprime borrowers — to keep the mortgage-securitization machine humming and big profits rolling in. But Jamie Dimon was (and still is) a risk control freak, and he kept the bank’s subprime shenanigans to a minimum. This kept JPMorgan not only solvent during the financial crisis, but actually strong — strong enough to be able to buy Bear Stearns as it was collapsing under the weight of its own toxic mortgage debt in March of 2008.

And JPMorgan has generally been on a roll ever …read more

Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

Has JPMorgan Finally Turned a Big Investing Corner?

By John Grgurich, The Motley Fool

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Potential backlash in the form of lawsuits and fines resulting from the housing boom and subsequent financial crisis have left many bank investors wary to go all-in on their favorite financial institutions, perhaps anxiously waiting for the other shoe to drop.

For JPMorgan Chase investors, at least, that plummeting piece of footwear may have been stopped dead in its tracks by a recent favorable court decision.

Here comes the judge
The Wall Street Journal is reporting that a federal judge has dismissed a major portion of a lawsuit against the superbank, one alleging it knowingly sold bad mortgage-backed securities to the European bank Dexia in the time leading up to the financial crash.

Specifically, the judge threw out that portion of the suit involving 65 mortgage-backed securities issued in 51 offerings, but allowed the suit to continue on five other mortgage-backed securities JPMorgan sold to Dexia. 

Foolish bottom line
This is a big win for JPMorgan. The dismissal of such a large portion of this suit may be a signal that the country’s biggest bank has made it through the worst of its housing-boom related difficulties. How? By possibly setting legal precedent for other housing-boom related suits the bank may be facing.

If JPMorgan can have 65 potential mortgage-backed securities claims so quickly and summarily thrown out of court, investors can be genuinely hopeful the same may happen in other pending cases. Such a decision could also be a shot across the bow for other plaintiffs contemplating similar legal action.

Four-plus years on from the start of the financial crisis, many of the big banks are still in a kind of no-man’s land when it comes to the end game, which leaves investors in a similarly grim place.

Just this past January, Bank of America settled with federal housing giant Fannie Mae for $10 billion over claims relating to the housing boom. Such a massive settlement this far out from the crash rightly frightens potential investors, leaving them to wonder, “Where does it all end?”

Of course, this big win for JPMorgan is no guarantee private lawsuits aren’t going to continue popping up, and there’s nothing saying U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff‘s decision won’t be reversed on appeal (though The Wall Street Journal piece made no mention of that).  

And the superbank is still facing a lawsuit filed in 2012 by New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman over allegedly fraudulent deals done by Bear Stearns, the fast-failing investment bank JPMorgan scooped up for next to nothing in March of 2008.

Still, investors should be reasonably buoyed by this action. And if Judge Rakoff‘s decision sets a precedent for the rest of the banking sector regarding suits related to mortgage-backed securities, all the better: If the big banks are still too big to fail, and too big to jail per U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, we might as well let them — and their shareholders — get on with the business …read more

Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

Macquarie Capital Broadens Industry Coverage with Key Hire in Consumer/Retail

By Business Wirevia The Motley Fool

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Macquarie Capital Broadens Industry Coverage with Key Hire in Consumer/Retail

  • Industry veteran Greg Shaia joins Macquarie Capital as US Head of its Consumer/Retail practice
  • Builds on Macquarie Capital‘s US momentum in advisory and capital markets

NEW YORK–(BUSINESS WIRE)– Macquarie Group (“Macquarie”) (ASX: MQG; ADR: MQBKY) today announced that Greg Shaia has joined Macquarie Capital in its Industrials industry coverage group as a Senior Managing Director and US Head of Consumer/Retail coverage.

“Greg’s deep expertise in the consumer and retail sector will help us to continue to broaden our industry coverage,” said Robert Bertagna, Global Head of Industrials for Macquarie Capital. “He has been a trusted advisor to companies in this important sector for years.”

Mr. Shaia has 24 years of experience and has advised retail and consumer companies on a wide range of transactions, including M&A, leveraged buyouts, public and private equity and debt financings, and restructurings. He has advised corporate clients such as Estée Lauder, Church & Dwight, Coty, Party City and Pilot Travel Centers, and a number of financial sponsors.

Mr. Shaia most recently served as Head of Consumer/Retail at Moelis & Co. where, as a Managing Director, he covered consumer/retail companies since joining that firm in 2008. Prior to his time at Moelis, Mr. Shaia worked as a Senior Managing Director and the Head of Retail and Apparel Investment Banking at Bear Stearns & Co.

Before joining Bear Stearns in 2004, Mr. Shaia was a Managing Director and ran Soft-Lines and Broad-Lines Retail and Apparel Investment Banking at Citigroup. Mr. Shaia began his career in investment banking as an associate in the Corporate Finance department of Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1989.

“Greg’s appointment will enable our firm to continue the expansion of our advisory and capital markets business in the US,” said Robert Redmond, Head of Macquarie Capital for the US and Latin America. “We have significant momentum and aim to build on it with Greg’s track record of success.”

Mr. Shaia graduated with a B.A. in Literature from Georgetown University and graduated Beta Gamma Sigma with an M.B.A. in Finance from Columbia Business School.

About Macquarie Group

Macquarie Group (Macquarie) is a global provider of banking, financial, advisory, investment and funds management …read more
Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

Americans More Financially Savvy Post-Recession, Survey Shows

By The Associated Press

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jupiterimages

By MARK JEWELL

BOSTON — The frugality and investing discipline that the 2008 financial crisis imposed on Americans appear to have led to permanent changes in behavior on money matters, according to a survey by the nation’s second largest mutual fund company.

Spendthrift ways are unlikely to again become as pervasive as they were before the crisis, Fidelity Investments concluded Wednesday in releasing results of its “Five Years After” survey of nearly 1,200 investors.

Positive behaviors that appear to be now entrenched include saving more in 401(k) plans, paying down debt and taking greater care to invest wisely.

“These tend to be very sticky decisions, because you begin to budget and spend around a higher savings rate,” said John Sweeney, an executive vice president on retirement and investing with Boston-based Fidelity. “People are taking control of their financial lives, and control breeds confidence.”

Survey participants were interviewed over two weeks in February, nearly five years after the government-brokered rescue sale of Wall Street firm Bear Stearns to JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM). That event, in March 2008, is regarded as a tipping point for more the tumultuous upheavals that followed, including the September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, which the government allowed to fail.

Housing prices plunged, unemployment spiked and stocks tumbled more than 50 percent from the market’s October 2007 high to its March 2009 low. It wasn’t until last month that the Dow Jones industrial average (^DJI) returned to its pre-crisis high.

Key survey findings include:

  • Fifty-six percent reported their financial outlooks changed from feeling scared or confused at the beginning of the crisis to confident or prepared five years later.
  • Survey participants estimated their household had lost 34 percent of the value of their total assets, on average, at the low point of the crisis. Thirty-five percent experienced what they considered to be a large drop in income, and 17 percent said at least one head of their household lost a job.
  • Forty-two percent increased the amounts of regular contributions to workplace savings plans such as 401(k)s, or to individual retirement accounts or health-savings accounts.
  • Fifty-five percent said they feel better prepared for retirement than they were before the crisis. However, among the group of survey participants who reported they continue to feel scared, just 34 percent said they’re better prepared for retirement.
  • Forty-nine percent have decreased their amount of personal debt, with 72 percent having less debt now than they did pre-crisis. Just 31 percent of those who indicated they’re still scared reported that they have reduced debt.
  • Forty-two percent have increased the size of the emergency fund they’ve established to meet large unexpected expenses. Among those self-reporting as scared, only 24 percent have a bigger emergency fund than they had pre-crisis.
  • Seventy-eight percent of those saying they’re prepared and confident said the financial actions they’ve taken are permanent …read more
    Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

Reagan Budget Guru Declares: We’ve Been Lied To, Robbed, And Misled…

Then, when the Fed’s fire hoses started spraying an elephant soup of liquidity injections in every direction and its balance sheet grew by $1.3 trillion in just thirteen weeks compared to $850 billion during its first ninety-four years, I became convinced that the Fed was flying by the seat of its pants, making it up as it went along. It was evident that its aim was to stop the hissy fit on Wall Street and that the thread of a Great Depression 2.0 was just a cover story for a panicked spree of money printing that exceeded any other episode in recorded human history.

David StockmanThe Great Deformation

David Stockman, former director of the OMB under President Reagan, former US Representative, and veteran financier is an insider’s insider. Few people understand the ways in which both Washington DC and Wall Street work and intersect better than he does.

In his upcoming book, The Great Deformation: The Corruption of Capitalism in America, Stockman lays out how we have devolved from a free market economy into a managed one that operates for the benefit of a privileged few. And when trouble arises, these few are bailed out at the expense of the public good.

By manipulating the price of money through sustained and historically low interest rates, Greenspan and Bernanke created an era of asset mis-pricing that inevitably would need to correct.  And when market forces attempted to do so in 2008, Paulson et al hoodwinked the world into believing the repercussions would be so calamitous for all that the institutions responsible for the bad actions that instigated the problem needed to be rescued — in full — at all costs. 

Of course, history shows that our markets and economy would have been better off had the system been allowed to correct. Most of the “too big to fail” institutions would have survived or been broken into smaller, more resilient, entities. For those that would have failed, smaller, more responsible banks would have stepped up to replace them – as happens as part of the natural course of a free market system:

Essentially there was a cleansing run on the wholesale funding market in the canyons of Wall Street going on. It would have worked its will, just like JP Morgan allowed it to happen in 1907 when we did not have the Fed getting in the way. Because they stopped it in its tracks after the AIG bailout and then all the alphabet soup of different lines that the Fed threw out, and then the enactment of TARP, the last two investment banks standing were rescued, Goldman and Morgan [Stanley], and they should not have been. As a result of being rescued and having the cleansing liquidation of rotten balance sheets stopped, within a few weeks and certainly months they were back to the same old games, such that Goldman Sachs got $10 billion dollars for the fiscal year that started three months later after that check went out, which was October 2008. For the fiscal 2009 year, Goldman Sachs generated what I call a $29 billion surplus – $13 billion of net income after tax, and on top of that $16 billion of salaries and bonuses, 95% of it which was bonuses.

Therefore, the idea that they were on death’s door does not stack up. Even if they had been, it would not make any difference to the health of the financial system. These firms are supposed to come and go, and if people make really bad bets, if they have a trillion dollar balance sheet with six, seven, eight hundred billion dollars worth of hot-money short-term funding, then they ought to take their just reward, because it would create lessons, it would create discipline. So all the new firms that would have been formed out of the remnants of Goldman Sachs where everybody lost their stock values – which for most of these partners is tens of millions, hundreds of millions – when they formed a new firm, I doubt whether they would have gone back to the old game. What happened was the Fed stopped everything in its tracks, kept Goldman Sachs intact, the reckless Goldman Sachs and the reckless Morgan Stanley, everyone quickly recovered their stock value and the game continues. This is one of the evils that comes from this kind of deep intervention in the capital and money markets.

Stockman’s anger at the unnecessary and unfair capital transfer from taxpayer to TBTF bank is matched only by his concern that, even with those bailouts, the banking system is still unacceptably vulnerable to a repeat of the same crime:

The banks quickly worked out their solvency issues because the Fed basically took it out of the hides of Main Street savers and depositors throughout America. When the Fed panicked, it basically destroyed the free-market interest rate – you cannot have capitalism, you cannot have healthy financial markets without an interest rate, which is the price of money, the price of capital that can freely measure and reflect risk and true economic prospects.

Well, once you basically unplug the pricing mechanism of a capital market and make it entirely an administered rate by the Fed, you are going to cause all kinds of deformationsas I call them, or mal-investments as some of the Austrians used to call them, that basically pollutes and corrupts the system. Look at the deposit rate right now, it is 50 basis points, maybe 40, for six months. As a result of that, probably $400-500 billion a year is being transferred as a fiscal maneuver by the Fed from savers to the banks. They are collecting the spread, they’ve then booked the profits, they’ve rebuilt their book net worth, and they paid back the TARP basically out of what was thieved from the savers of America.

Now they go down and pound the table and whine and pout like JP Morgan and the rest of them,you have to let us do stock buy backs, you have to let us pay out dividends so we can ramp our stock and collect our stock option winnings. It is outrageous that the authorities, after the so-called “near death experience” of 2008 and this massive fiscal safety net and monetary safety net was put out there, is allowing them to pay dividends and to go into the market and buy back their stockThey should be under house arrest in a sense that every dime they are making from this artificial yield group being delivered by the Fed out of the hides of savers should be put on their balance sheet to build up retained earnings, to build up a cushion. I do not care whether it is fifteen or twenty or twenty-five percent common equity and retained earnings-to-assets or not, that is what we should be doing if we are going to protect the system from another raid by these people the next time we get a meltdown, which can happen at any time.

You can see why I talk about corruption, why crony capitalism is so bad. I mean, the Basel capital standards, they are a joke. We are just allowing the banks to go back into the same old game they were playing before. Everybody said the banks in late 2007 were the greatest thing since sliced bread. The market cap of the ten largest banks in America, including from Bear Stearns all the way to Citibank and JP Morgan and Goldman and so forth, was $1.25 trillion. That was up thirty times from where the predecessors of those institutions had been. Only in 1987, when Greenspan took over and began the era of bubble finance – slowly at first then rapidly, eventually, to have the market cap grow thirty times – and then on the eve of the great meltdown see the $1.25 trillion to market cap disappear, vanish, vaporize in panic in September 2008. Only a few months later, $1 trillion of that market cap disappeared in to the abyss and panic, and Bear Stearns is going down, and all the rest.

This tells you the system is dramatically unstable. In a healthy financial system and a free capital market, if I can put it that way, you are not going to have stuff going from nowhere to @1.2 trillion and then back to a trillion practically at the drop of a hat. That is instability; that is a case of a medicated market that is essentially very dangerous and is one of the many adverse consequences and deformations that result from the central-bank dominated, corrupt monetary system that has slowly built up ever since Nixon closed the gold window, but really as I say in my book, going back to 1933 in April when Roosevelt took all the private gold. So we are in a big dead-end trap, and they are digging deeper every time you get a new maneuver.

Reagan Budget Guru Declares: We've Been Lied To, Robbed, And Misled...

(Second column, 3rd story, link)


…read more
Source: Drudge Report

Debbie Salce Named Treasurer at Pitney Bowes

By Business Wirevia The Motley Fool

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Debbie Salce Named Treasurer at Pitney Bowes

STAMFORD, Conn.–(BUSINESS WIRE)– Pitney Bowes Inc. (NYS: PBI) announced today the appointment of Debbie Salce to the position of Vice President and Treasurer, reporting to Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer Michael Monahan. Salce was also elected an officer of the company. Salce succeeds Helen Shan, who will leave Pitney Bowes for Marsh & McClennan Companies, Inc., (NYS: MMC) on March 31.

As Treasurer, Salce will have global responsibility for all Treasury operations, including capital markets, cash management, foreign exchange risk management, pensions, and insurance management.

“Debbie takes on her leadership role as a fully-tested veteran finance executive,” said Monahan. “She is an exceptional business leader who brings deep knowledge of our company and a wealth of professional experience to the position of Treasurer.”

Salce joined Pitney Bowes in 2001 as Director of Capital Markets. She has held roles of increasing responsibility since then, including Vice President and Assistant Treasurer, and Vice President for Enterprise Performance Management. Before joining Pitney Bowes, Salce worked as an investment banker for seven years with Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns and Citigroup.

Salce holds a Bachelor’s degree in Economics and Political Science from the University of Connecticut, and an MBA from the Graduate School of Business at Columbia University in New York.

About Pitney Bowes

Pitney Bowes provides technology solutions for small, mid-size and large firms that help them connect with customers to build loyalty and grow revenue. The company’s solutions for financial services, healthcare, legal, nonprofit, public sector and retail organizations are delivered on open platforms to best organize, analyze and apply both public and proprietary data to two-way customer communications. Pitney Bowes is the only firm that includes direct mail, transactional mail, call centers and in-store technologies in its solution mix along with digital channels such as the Web, email, live chat and mobile applications. Pitney Bowes has approximately USD $5 billion in annual revenue and 27,000 employees worldwide. Pitney Bowes: Every connection is a new opportunity™. www.pb.com

Pitney Bowes
Matthew Broder, 203-351-6347
Vice President, External Communications
matthew.broder@pb.com

KEYWORDS:   United States  North …read more
Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

Should Jamie Dimon Say Goodbye to His Role As Chairman?

By John Grgurich, The Motley Fool

Filed under:

A group of powerful investors is calling for the head of JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon. Well, at least one of his heads. The coalition wants to split the duties of CEO and Chairman, both of which Dimon currently performs.

At this point, it doesn’t look like it’s going to happen, though it’s time to consider the idea.

AFSCME asks again
The coalition includes the AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, Hermes Equity Ownership Services, and the NYC Pension Funds. Together these groups hold $820 million in JPMorgan shares.

According to the group’s press release, the filing to name an independent board chairman “reflects mounting investor concerns with the board’s oversight in the wake of the London Whale losses, recent regulatory sanctions, and its failure to fully demonstrate that it can manage the size and complexity of its balance sheet.”

A similar proposal, filed by the AFSCME Employees Pension Plan last year and voted on by shareholders, garnered a 40% approval rating. JPMorgan shareholders will have the chance to vote on this new proposal in May.

Foolish bottom line
This shareholder proposal couldn’t have come at a worse time for Dimon. JPMorgan has had the bad week of bad weeks.

The good news for Dimon is, the board will likely back him in his current dual-role job structures. But this good news for Dimon is also bad news for shareholders, and potentially the taxpaying public at large.

With trillions of dollars in assets, JPMorgan is a beast for any one person to stay reliably on top of, and Jamie Dimon isn’t just any old CEO. In this Fool’s opinion, he’s the best risk manager in the business.

His obsessive fear of risk is exactly what kept JPMorgan away from the worst excesses of the housing boom, and even allowed the superbank to scoop up Bear Stearns as it was failing back in 2008: a boon not just for the bank but also for the country, as a bankrupt Bear might have touched off the financial crash months sooner.

The London Whale incident, while never a threat to the solvency of the bank, nevertheless showed that even the best CEOs can’t keep their eye on everything going on in a giant organization like JPMorgan. A second, critical eye on the bank’s operations could only be a help.

Unfortunately, that doesn’t look like it’s going to happen. But there’s always next year.

Looking for in-depth analysis on JPMorgan? Check out a new Motley Fool report on the superbank, written by Ilan Moscovitz — The Motley Fool‘s senior banking analyst and JPMorgan Chase specialist.

You’ll learn where the key opportunities for the superbank lie, where its core growth will come from, and the potential business risks. You’ll also get an analysis of its leadership team. For immediate access click here now.

…read more
Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

Automotive Milestones and Financial Meltdowns

By Alex Planes, The Motley Fool

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On this day in economic and financial history …

JPMorgan Chase made an offer to acquire freefalling Bear Stearns for just $2 per share on March 16, 2008. The Sunday deal, a 93% discount to Bear Stearns‘ closing price of two days earlier, was put forth after an earlier bridge-loan agreement between the two banks and the Federal Reserve fell through. It was one of the watershed moments in the 2008 financial crisis, a signal that the problems plaguing the financial sector were both deeper and more systemic than previously believed. The minuscule offer price, at just $236 million in total, was a third of Bear Stearns‘ 1985 offer price, and a tiny sliver of the $170 shares fetched in March of 2007. The Fed, rather than offering loans to prop up Bear Stearns, provided financing to help JPMorgan close the transaction and promised up to $30 billion in funding to prop up Bear Stearns‘ “less-liquid assets.”

Bear Stearns shareholders and employees were furious with the backroom deal, which all but wiped them out. Fierce protests pushed JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon to raise the offer to $10 per share  less than two weeks later, in an effort to stem mass defections of key talent and avoid an outright shareholder revolt. This offer pushed Bear Stearns‘ shares above the offer price to $11.25, but it proved immaterial when the $10-per-share sale price was approved at the end of May. Bear Stearns‘ tortured saga was over, but the financial crisis had yet to enter high gear.

Might as well call it a day
On the other side of the coin from the wild crisis days is the dullness of March 16, 1830, the slowest day in New York Stock Exchange history. That day, a mere 31 shares exchanged hands — 26 shares of the United States Bank and five shares of Morris Canal and Banking, at a total value of just $3,470. That was low even by 1830s standards, as the first years of that decade typically saw at least 1,000 shares traded on a given day. Maybe stockbrokers would have been better off going fishing.

Up, up and away!
Robert Goddard inaugurated the age of modern rocketry when he launched the first liquid-fueled rocket into the sky over Auburn, Mass., on March 16, 1926. Like other first flights, Goddard’s first rocket wasn’t especially impressive by modern standards. The liquid oxygen and gasoline-fueled rocket rose 40 feet in the air over 2.5 seconds, traveling 185 feet across the earth before crashing.

Goddard continued to experiment with rocketry until his death in 1945, amassing more than 200 rocket-related patents in the process. His work helped lay the foundation of the Apollo program, which sent men to the moon and produced many technological advances that continue to benefit humanity today.

The auto industry represents
General Motors joined …read more
Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

5-Year Anniversary: The Epic Collapse of Bear Stearns

By Matt Koppenheffer, The Motley Fool

Filed under:

A two-dollar bill taped over Bear Stearns‘ logo at its Madison Avenue headquarters just about said it all. On March 16, 2008, after a profound loss of confidence by Bear Stearns‘ lenders, circumstances — and the federal government — pushed the venerable investment bank into the arms of JPMorgan Chase  for a mere $2 per share.

Though the deal was later recut to $10 per share, it was cold comfort to employees and major Bear investors. The week prior, shares changed hands at $70. In January 2007, the stock had fetched more than $170.

Ask why Bear fell, and perhaps the best answer is the easiest: leverage. At the end of the last quarter before its fire-sale, the bank was levered at nearly 34-to-1. At that nosebleed level, a mere 3% drop in the value of its assets was all it would take to wipe out its entire equity base. 

In essence, Bear was betting the house on its traders, bankers, and managers being right… all the time… or else.

But while some versions of the pre-crisis Wall Street narrative suggest that banks — and investment banks in particular — got risky in the period just preceding the crisis, this penchant for balance-sheet risk-taking wasn’t new at Bear. Look back over the decade preceding its collapse: Bear almost continually kept an end-of-year leverage ratio approaching, or above, 30. And at many Wall Street firms, the end-of-period leverage ratio is considerably lower than what they’re running around with mid-quarter.

A Dangerous Addiction to Leverage | Create infographics.

It’d also be a mistake to say this was an infection of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Though many — including past Bear leadership — point fingers at former CEO Jimmy Cayne, Bear was a swashbuckling outfit. The bank was full of high-octane financiers making a name for Bear by taking on trades and business lines that competitors often wouldn’t. They were voracious card players. They were gamblers.

Bear Stearns had a long and successful history. But in many ways, it was a powder keg of risk, just waiting for the right crisis to blow the entire edifice to bits.

The leverage ratio, of course, no more tells the whole story of Bear’s collapse than the Battle of Yorktown tells the whole story of the Revolutionary War. The nature of Bear’s financing — and that of its competitors — played a significant role. With roughly a quarter to a third of its liabilities coming from short-term repurchase agreements, there was little guaranteed stability in the ground on which the firm stood.

The bank was likewise at the very heart of the structured-security business that suffered the most during the crisis. In 2006, $5 billion of Bear’s $9 billion in total revenue came from principal trading — nearly three-quarters of which came from fixed-income products like mortgage-backed securities, leveraged loans, and credit derivatives. …read more
Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

Could Bear Stearns Happen Again Today?

By Matt Koppenheffer, The Motley Fool

Filed under:

On the fifth anniversary of the breath-taking collapse of Bear Stearns and its rushed, $2-per-share sale to 
JPMorgan Chase 
, one obvious question to ask is whether a similar stunning unraveling could happen again today.

After picking through the rubble left in Bear’s wake, the bank’s demise could be boiled down to three main ingredients:

  1. High amounts of leverage.
  2. A reliance on short-term financing.
  3. Confidence-spooking principal trades.

If we want to be sure that a Bear-like collapse couldn’t happen again, we’d want to be sure those three ingredients couldn’t come together in such a way that the same type of implosion could occur.

Oops… too late
Unfortunately, we have an unsettling answer to both whether those conditions could be allowed to come together again and whether a Bear-like collapse could reoccur. That answer, in just four syllables, is “MF Global.”

On Halloween 2011, the derivatives broker run by former Goldman Sachs  CEO Jon Corzine, declared bankruptcy. The proximate causes of MF Global’s fall were eerily similar to those of Bear Stearns.

1. Highly leveraged? Check.
For the June 2011 quarter — the last that MF Global would report — its gross leverage (assets divided by shareholders’ equity) was a dizzying 33-to-1. Just prior to its collapse, Bear Stearns‘ leverage ratio was 34-to-1.

2. Heavily dependent on short-term financing? Check.
At the end of the June quarter, MF Global had $18 billion in repurchase financing. This is a short-term, collateralized type of financing that often allows lenders to pull their loans with as little as 24 hours notice. These repo lines accounted for more than 40% of MF Global’s financing. 

In the years leading up to its demise, Bear Stearns typically had a quarter to a third of its liabilities in repo loans.

3. Trades that made lenders uneasy? Check.
For Bear Stearns, it was the bank’s holdings of potentially toxic mortgage- and asset-backed securities that put its counterparties on edge. At MF Global, CEO Corzine, playing the part of trader-in-chief, constructed an outsized trade around the debt of European sovereigns including Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, right when the market was the most uneasy about the future of those economies.

Two giant elephants in the room
When considering whether there could be a repeat of Bear Stears though, most of us aren’t immediately thinking about MF Global or other smaller brokers and investment banks. We’re thinking about two of Bear’s blood rivals: Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley .

But if we stack Goldman and Morgan and their current stats against Bear and MF Global, it’s easy to see that they give the system a lot less to stress about.

Could It Happen Again? | InfographicsNote: Bear Stearns as of 2/29/2008. MF Global as of 6/30/2011. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley as of 12/31/2012. All data per SEC filings.

The follow-up concern to this data, however, is …read more
Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

5 Years on, 5 Lessons From Bear Stearns' Collapse

By Matt Koppenheffer, The Motley Fool

Filed under:

On March 16, 2008, Bear Stearns agreed to sell itself to 
JPMorgan Chase 
for $2 per share. The deal capped a breathtakingly rapid fall from grace of one of the major Wall Street players as the market lost faith in the firm and its balance sheet and financing partners stepped away.

There are any number of lessons that we can take away from the demise of Bear, but the following are five that stand out in particular to me.

1. “Too big to fail” means little to shareholders.
Bear Stearns was considered “too big to fail.” As the first of the major Wall Street firms that was staring down the barrel of bankruptcy, the government played a major role in the shotgun marriage between Bear and JPMorgan. For bondholders, this meant everything — they got 100 cents on the dollar. For equity holders, it was a completely different story.

Source: S&P Capital IQ.

Bear’s stock traded above $170 in early 2007 and was still fetching $30 the Friday before the $2-per-share deal with JPMorgan. Equity holders likely had plenty of colorful descriptors for how they felt after the deal, but “bailed out” was probably not among them.

Looking out over the banking landscape today, we see plenty of “too big to fail” banks. Bear’s parent, JPMorgan is one of them. Bank of AmericaCitigroup, and Wells Fargo are all undoubtedly too big to fail as well. Investment banking giants Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley probably belong in that group as well. 

But make no doubt about it, if any of these banks do mess around and get themselves into trouble, it’s not the shareholders that will get rescued.

2. Management matters.
If there’s one single thing for investors to take away from the financial crisis, it’s the importance of management. Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf — and Dick Kovacevich before him — isn’t on the ground making loans, but senior leadership is setting the tone for the company and deciding when to push forward and when to go on the defensive. Thanks to strong, conservative management, Wells performed well through the crisis. Citi — whose then-CEO Chuck Prince famously quipped, “As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance… We’re still dancing.” — didn’t.

It’s easy to paint a caricature of the cigar-chomping, bridge-playing Jimmy Cayne at Bear Stearns. Cayne famously ticked off everyone else on Wall Street when he refused to join in on the consortium bailout of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. Instead of being at the helm of the troubled ship as Bear started to falter, Cayne was often traveling to bridge tournaments instead. And aside from his ubiquitous cigars, it’s also been reported that he was a more-than-occasional pot smoker. Anecdotes don’t paint the full picture, but they’re certainly telling.

In the wake of Knight Capital‘s epic trading meltdown last summer, one Wall Street …read more
Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

A Timeline of Bear Stearns' Downfall

By John Maxfield, The Motley Fool

Filed under:

Investment banking is a peculiar business. It takes decades and, in some cases, over a century to build a market-leading operation, only to then watch as it fails in a matter of days. While overleverage is often the predicate, a loss of confidence is the exciting cause. It’s like a roaring avalanche triggered by an otherwise benign disruption far down the mountain.

For those on Wall Street who had forgotten this lesson in the heady days of the housing bubble, the second week of March 2008 served as an unwelcome reminder. Over the course of seven days, the nation’s fifth largest investment bank went from being profitable and seemingly overcapitalized, to being forcibly led to the auction block by its government overseers. Less than a week after trading for $65 per share, the 85-year-old investment bank Bear Stearns could garner no more than $2 from its across-the-street rival, JPMorgan Chase . And even that was conditioned upon a generous loss-sharing agreement with the Federal Reserve — though, to be fair, the price was posthumously increased to $10 a share to keep the peace.

What follows on this, the fifth anniversary of Bear’s collapse, is a brief look at the six most important dates that led to the storied bank’s downfall.

1993 — “I’m going to be the last CEO of Bear Stearns”
While it’s hard to know exactly what Jimmy Cayne, Bear’s CEO until January of 2008, meant by those words, it isn’t difficult to conclude that the public and humiliating failure of the bank wasn’t it. The reason I picked 1993 as the first date related to Bear’s downfall is because that was the year Cayne became CEO.

If there’s any truth to the notion that the character and culture of an organization is set at the top, then Cayne’s coronation was arguably the moment that sealed the Bear’s fate. He could hardly have been more different from his predecessor, Alan “Ace” Greenberg, who was known as a democratic, humble, hard-charging, risk-obsessed, and penny-pinching leader.

By comparison, Cayne was known for leaving the office early on Thursday to catch a chartered helicopter ride to various golf courses, taking multiple extended vacations each year to compete in bridge tournaments, and habitually smoking marijuana — yes, you read that right. But, worst of all, he purportedly had neither any interest in, nor knowledge of, risk management. And it was for this reason that Bear’s real estate traders were able to accumulate nearly $50 billion in mortgage-related assets on the bank’s balance sheet by the time the housing market began to hemorrhage.

July 2007 — “This is a watershed day”
During the first quarter of 2007, the signs of a problem in the housing market started to reveal themselves. Housing prices started to decline, mortgage delinquencies accelerated, and the secondary market for anything but the highest-quality mortgages began to show signs of fatigue.

The first line of institutions to feel the effects were mortgage originators like New …read more
Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

Jimmy Cayne: Architect or Victim of the Bear Stearns Debacle?

By Amanda Alix, The Motley Fool

Filed under:

Anniversaries often spark ruminations of past events, particularly those that have left a lasting mark on the world. This is especially true of calamities like the financial crisis, where musings serve the dual purposes of increasing understanding, and serving as a blueprint to prevent future, similar catastrophes.

Such is the case of Bear Stearns, the venerable investment bank whose spectacular flame-out prompted its sale to JPMorgan Chase .

Five years have passed since this harbinger of the worldwide financial meltdown occurred, and trying to pin the blame on any one person is, of course, an exercise in futility. In taking a look back to that time, however, one name stands out: James “Jimmy” Cayne, the card-playing risk-taker who held the position of CEO at the time of Bear’s demise.

While Cayne has had the lion’s share of vitriol heaped upon him since that dark time in Bear’s history, he was also a creature of his times, when incongruous financial products were being churned out at a frenzied pace, and increasing leverage was all the rage. Was Cayne, in fact, the cause of the firm’s implosion, or merely a casualty of those heady days?

A little history
Bear Stearns had a long and storied history, a focal point of which was its survival after the 1929 stock market crash, and ensuing Great Depression. Founded as an equity trading firm by Joseph Bear, Robert Stearns, and Harold Mayer in 1923, the bank had been successful in that business during the 1920s, and had amassed a comfortable cash cushion when hard times hit, enabling it to thrive without laying off employees or cutting bonuses. Roosevelt’s New Deal was a boon to the firm, and it brought in grand sums selling government and corporate bonds to other banks. When private utility companies were disbanded and made public in 1935 after the passage of the Public Utilities Holding Act, Bear raked in even more profits selling the securities that made that changeover possible.

The next few decades saw Bear grow expansively, as its risk-taking attitude prompted it to take advantage of opportunities such as the near-failure of New York City in the 1970s. Scarfing up those dicey securities issued by the city was a risky bet, but the bank made a tidy profit on the transaction.

Leadership changes pushed up the risk factor
For most of this time, the bank had been led by Salim Lewis, who had come on board in 1933 to head up the bank’s institutional bond trading department. When Lewis passed away in 1978, Alan Greenberg took over as chair, and his emphasis on short-term gains led the bank to become a takeover powerhouse. It was under his leadership that the company went public in 1985, as the Bear Stearns Companies.

In 1992, Bear had its best year ever, with earnings topping $295 million. The next year, James Cayne took over as CEO, displacing Greenberg, who stayed on as chair. With Cayne at the top, Bear …read more
Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

Chart: How Too Big to Fail Came to Be

By John Maxfield, The Motley Fool

Filed under:

Since the financial crisis, there’s been a palatable and growing sense of discontent toward the so-called too-big-to-fail banks. The chairman of the Federal Reserve was grilled three weeks ago by senators after a study estimated that the nation’s biggest banks get an implied government subsidy of $83 billion a year. And last week, the Attorney General was castigated by Senator Chuck Grassley for not pursuing the largest lenders criminally, referring to them as “too big to jail.”

The irony in all of this is the fact that the big banks have grown considerably larger over the past few years. Wells Fargo has nearly tripled in size since the end of 2007 thanks to its purchase of Wachovia. JPMorgan Chase has grown by more than 50% over the same time period following its acquisitions of Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual. Even Bank of America‘s assets have increased by 29%. The only exception to this rule is Citigroup , which has shed nearly 15% of its assets over the past five years.

While this may seem paradoxical, the reality is that, up until now, the financial crisis has served as an enormous catalyst for consolidation. Have banks failed since it erupted? Of course. Since the beginning of 2008, 472 have met their regulatory maker. But the vast majority of these consisted of smaller, community banks. As you can see in the interactive chart below, between 2005 and the end of last year, the share of assets held by $10-billion-plus banks has ratcheted up from 73% to more than 80%.

The Evolution of Too Big To Fail: Market Share by Bank Size | Infographics.

Beyond this paradox, the point I’m trying to make here is simple. While politicians — even seemingly well-meaning ones like Senator Elizabeth Warren — use the too-big-to-fail issue as a way to garner political points, breaking up the big banks goes against decades of history. On the heels of the deregulatory fervor of the 1980s, 90s, and 2000s — which many still-serving politicians championed at the time — a handful of financial institutions have effectively cornered the financial industry. As a result, the question now isn’t whether big banks should be broken up, but rather whether it’s even feasible to do so.

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…read more
Source: FULL ARTICLE at DailyFinance

Justice Department Probing JPMorgan Over Bear Stearns Mortgage Products

By The Huffington Post News Editors

By Karen Freifeld and Aruna Viswanatha

(Reuters) – The U.S. Justice Department is investigating JPMorgan Chase & Co over allegations that Bear Stearns provided misleading information about its mortgage products during the lead-up to the financial crisis, according to people familiar with the matter.

JPMorgan acquired Bear Stearns in a 2008 fire sale encouraged by the government, and has pushed back against various government suits that have sought to hold JPMorgan accountable for the failed investment bank’s alleged mortgage-related misconduct.

Read More…
More on Bear Stearns

…read more
Source: FULL ARTICLE at Huffington Post

U.S. DOJ probing JPMorgan over Bear Stearns mortgage products

The entrance to JPMorgan Chase's international headquarters on Park Avenue is seen in New York

(Reuters) – The U.S. Justice Department is investigating JPMorgan Chase & Co over allegations that Bear Stearns provided misleading information about its mortgage products during the lead-up to the financial crisis, according to people familiar with the matter. JPMorgan acquired Bear Stearns in a 2008 fire sale encouraged by the government, and has pushed back against various government suits that have sought to hold JPMorgan accountable for the failed investment bank's alleged mortgage-related misconduct. …

…read more
Source: FULL ARTICLE at Yahoo Business

What JPM,BAC,C,GS, MS,HSBC,BCS,UBS, Have in Common

By Robert Lenzner, Forbes Staff Not a week goes by without one of these financial institutions agreeing to pay a huge fine, settle a lawsuit charging fraud, be sued, blued and tattooed by a myriad of private plaintiffs, regulatory organizations concerning a broad sweep of activities that together give a sordid portrait of the global financial system. I find it difficult to absorb the charges these giants sold the public mortgage securities less valuable than portrayed, or laundered money for drug gangs, terrorist groups and nations like Iran that were on an embargoed list, or participated in another allegedly fraudulent practice that hurt their clients on behalf of the search for higher profits. So, I was not surprised that the Justice Department decided to sue the rating agency Standard & Poors for allegedly rating the credit quality of some faulty securities that collapsed in value during the meltdown of 2008. Still, I have a feeling the demand for a fine of $5 billion from the rating agency on transactions where the profit was a modest $33 million alerts me to the possible notion of excess government demands. I reckon these demands– and the swelter of ongoing investigations and lawsuits before the statute of limitations is over– has to do with the public’s anger at being exploited by the denizens of Wall Street. I reckon it has to with finally putting Brandeis’ glorious disinfectant on the wrongs done and making transparent to some greater extent precisely what went on behind the scenes in the financial community. It has also to do with the inability– harsh critics say unwillingness– of Uncle Sam to put a few corner-office culprits in prison. Justice takes time because investigations require careful discovery of who did what to whom as exampled in the email traffic at the core of the S & P case as well as most of the money laundering which involved bankers on foreign shores who may not be subject to the vestiges of American criminal law. For example, we still don’t know whom exactly is responsible for shifting the deposits of Iran from Europe or the UK to our shores. We don’t know — and we may never know who at HSBC decided to do business with Mexican drug cartels and arms of Al Qaeda. Note well; they were European institutions, not American, But, they were European institutions operating here. Be prepared for a further onslaught of lawsuits, many brought by foreign buyers of the damned mortgage-backed securities merchandised willy-nilly by Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual before they were purchased by JP Morgan, Bank of America and others. I am told there are 175 suits against Standard & Poors including several from Arab institutions. There are still investigations from state Attorney-Generals and most likely from the Justice Department. This means reserves for litigation by the banks will be hiked in preparation, which does impair earnings to some extent. It means the staining of reputations and more importantly raises the question about the adherence to statutes, and …read more
Source: FULL ARTICLE at Forbes Latest