By Steve Forbes, Forbes Staff

Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare From Ancient Times to the Presentby Max Boot (Liveright Publishing Corp., $35) This is a comprehensive history of guerrilla warfare, breezily written and chock-full of perceptive insights. Despite the impression today that this kind of irregular fighting is a modern phenomenon, it actually goes back to the beginning of mankind. Even fighting in Europe during the Middle Ages didn’t resemble that of the organized armies we think of today. Irregular warfare is the way the weak combat the strong. Fighting a set, WWII-like battle against superior numbers and firepower is, of course, a recipe for defeat. So elusive hit-and-run tactics are the norm for a weaker force, until the superior army gives up in frustration. In modern times, as author Boot hammers home, public opinion has come to play a critical role, as the French and American experiences in Southeast Asia testify. Most insurgencies require outside assistance. The American colonists, for instance, would never have defeated the British without the enormous aid of France. Lack of outside help was a critical reason that the American Indian, an oft-skilled guerrilla fighter, ultimately failed. The Boers nearly beat the superior British in South Africa more than 100 years ago, but they, too, received no outside aid. There are exceptions: Castro’s takeover of Cuba, Ireland‘s war of independence against Britain and the amazing slave rebellion in Haiti. How should a government respond to an insurgency? Massive, indiscriminate retaliation rarely succeeds. A policy of occupy-and-hold needs to be employed: Rout the guerrillas in a certain area, then stay and win the trust of the locals. This is what we did in the Philippines in a war now forgotten, in which our death toll was almost the same as that we suffered in Iraq. Isolating the local population from guerrillas is essential and is what the British did during the 1948-60 insurgency in Malaya. In contrast, the U.S. Army treated the war in Vietnam as if it were a small version of WWII. Only after we pursued a new approach did the tide turn dramatically, but politically for the U.S. it was too late. We decided to keep an army in Korea (and have for 60 years) after that conflict ended, but because of fatigue we refused to provide real aid to the South Vietnamese, even though the North Vietnamese had lost the war militarily by 1972. The author chronicles numerous conflicts, but his pace never slows. He has a great feel for details, such as Mao’s refusing to brush his teeth, instead gargling with hot tea. Boot also does a nice job covering that evil twin of irregular warfare, terrorism. His account of the Anarchist movement of the late 19th century has some eerie echoes of what we’re facing today. All in all, a mighty impressive achievement, one that should be a bible for policymakers everywhere in the civilized world. For more previous blogs see: Steve Forbes …read more
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