Tag Archives: Abou Zeid

Mali extremist group says fighters, leader OK

One of the three extremist groups being driven back in northern Mali by French-led forces says its fighters and leader, Iyad Ag Ghali, are fine and determined to keep attacking.

In its statement published this week on Mauritanian website Sahara Media, Ansar Dine said: “Even if only sticks remain with us, we will fight you with them.”

For 10 months, Ansar Dine ruled a large swathe of northern Mali. In January, France launched a military intervention and removed the group from the main cities in the north, including Kidal, where Ag Ghali was based.

The French have since killed Abou Zeid, a major commander of the local al-Qaida affiliate, raising questions about the whereabouts of other leaders, including Ag Ghali.

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France confirms death of Al Qaeda chief Abou Zeid

France says Al Qaeda-linked North African warlord Abou Zeid was killed in combat with French troops in Mali in February.

In a statement Saturday the office of French President Francois Hollande said the death was “definitively confirmed” and that Zeid’s death “marks an important step in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel.”

Chad‘s president had said earlier this month that Chadian troops had killed Abou Zeid. He was a pillar of the southern realm of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, responsible for the death of at least two European hostages.

The French military moved into Mali on Jan. 11 to push back militants linked to Abou Zeid and other extremist groups who had imposed harsh Islamic rule.

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France confirms death of Al-Qaida chief Abou Zeid

France says Al-Qaida-linked North African warlord Abou Zeid was killed in combat with French troops in Mali in February.

In a statement Saturday the office of French President Francois Hollande said the death was “definitively confirmed” and that Zeid’s death “marks an important step in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel.”

Chad‘s president had said earlier this month that Chadian troops had killed Abou Zeid. He was a pillar of the southern realm of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, responsible for the death of at least two European hostages.

The French military moved into Mali on Jan. 11 to push back militants linked to Abou Zeid and other extremist groups who had imposed harsh Islamic rule.

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France: Key al-Qaida chief in Mali likely killed

France‘s top military man says it is “probable” that Abou Zeid, an al-Qaida leader in North Africa, was killed in military operations by French and Chadian forces in northern Mali.

However, Admiral Edouard Guillaud, the head of France‘s joint chiefs of staff, also said Chadian claims that their forces had killed Zeid, who is the Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb faction leader, could not be confirmed because “we haven’t recovered the body.”

Speaking Monday on Europe-1 radio, Guillaud also noted unverified chatter on Internet jihadist forums saying the suspected mastermind of Algerian hostage taking in January, Mokhtar Belmoktar, was alive. A Chadian military chief claimed he, too, was killed.

Guillaud said the French military operation to support Mali‘s government fight against the rebels is “breaking the kidneys” of AQIM.

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Head of Chadian army claims troops kill Belmoktar

The head of Chad‘s military has announced on state television that Chadian troops deployed in northern Mali killed Moktar Belmoktar, the international terrorist responsible for the attack on a natural gas plant in Algeria that resulted in the death of dozens of foreigners. The French military, which is leading the offensive in northern Mali, says it cannot confirm the information.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Zakaria Ngobongue read a statement saying Chadian soldiers on Saturday had destroyed a jihadist base in the Adrar and Ifoghas mountains of North Mali, killing Belmoktar.

The purported death of Belmoktar comes a day after Chad‘s president said their troops killed Abou Zeid, the other main al-Qaida commander in the region, a claim the French also said they could not confirm.

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Al Qaeda chief killed in Mali, Chad's president says

A presidential spokesman says that Chadian President Idriss Deby announced that Chadian troops fighting to dislodge an Al Qaeda affiliate in northern Mali killed one of the group’s leading commanders, Abou Zeid.

Officials in Mali and France, which is leading an international military intervention in Mali against Islamic extremists, could not confirm reports of the death of Abou Zeid. He is a leader of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and was behind the kidnapping of several Westerners.

The Chadian president’s spokesman said that Deby announced the death of Abou Zeid during a ceremony Friday for Chad‘s fallen soldiers.

The spokesman insisted on anonymity because he was not authorized to speak ahead of an announcement on state television on the matter. He gave no further details.

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Chad's president: Al-Qaida chief killed in Mali

A presidential spokesman says that Chadian President Idriss Deby announced that Chadian troops fighting to dislodge an al-Qaida affiliate in northern Mali killed one of the group’s leading commanders, Abou Zeid.

Officials in Mali and France, which is leading an international military intervention in Mali against Islamic extremists, could not confirm reports of the death of Abou Zeid. He is a leader of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and was behind the kidnapping of several Westerners.

The Chadian president’s spokesman said that Deby announced the death of Abou Zeid during a ceremony Friday for Chad‘s fallen soldiers.

The spokesman insisted on anonymity because he was not authorized to speak ahead of an announcement on state television on the matter. He gave no further details.

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Fight for Mali town reflects Islamist tactics

Abou Zeid, the shadowy and feared emir of one of al-Qaida’s most successful cells, commandeered the packed-dirt home of a family here last week, embedding himself and his hundreds of men in this community of rice growers. He ate spaghetti and powdered milk, read the Quran and planned a war.

His bearded and turbaned men parked cars under the mango trees of the farmers, slept in their bedrooms and turned their courtyards into command centers and their warehouses into armories. And it took eight days before French air strikes finally drove them out of Diabaly, a pinprick of a town, in the first major showdown of the struggle to reclaim Mali‘s al-Qaida-occupied north.

The tactics used by the Islamist fighters in Diabaly offer a peephole into the kind of insurgency they plan to lead, and suggest the challenges the international community will face in the effort to dislodge them. They show how the Islamists are holding their ground despite a superior French force with sophisticated fighter jets, a fleet of combat helicopters and hundreds of soldiers armed with night vision goggles and 70 mm cannons.

“The only thing that prevented the French planes from annihilating these people is that they were hiding in our homes. The French did everything to avoid civilian casualties,” said Gaoussou Kone, a resident of the Berlin neighborhood of Diabaly, where Abou Zeid set up his command center. “That’s why it took so long to liberate Diabaly.”

Testimony from families, statements by French and local officials and the trash left behind by the fighters — including a handwritten inventory of weapons — provide a sketch of how the Islamists operated. The portrait that emerges is of a determined and nimble band of fighters, who have adapted to the terrain around them and who instinctively understand that France, which unilaterally launched the intervention 12 days ago in their former West African colony, cannot afford to kill civilians.

The strategy of melting into the population and of winning over the communities who house them is one that al-Qaida has already used successfully elsewhere, including in Afghanistan. It’s now being perfected in Mali by a new generation of jihadists, like Abou Zeid, with coaching from the terror network’s veterans.

“They have seasoned al-Qaida fighters that have fought overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan and that are essentially providing coaching and training,” said Rudolph Atallah, former director of counterterrorism for Africa at the Pentagon, who has led several defense missions to Mali.

Diabaly, population 35,000, only one of everything — one pharmacy, one road, one secondary school.

Kone and his neighbors were woken up at 3 a.m. on Monday, Jan. 14, by the sound of gunfire. By breakfast time, the column of fighters entered the town, and the government soldiers stationed here were seen fleeing on foot. The combatants wore bulletproof vests over an unfamiliar style of tunic that stopped at their knees, meant to evoke that worn by the Prophet Muhammad in the 7th century.

They handed out candy to the children and took down the Malian flag flapping above the school. Then they scouted out houses.

“It was Monday at around 7:30 a.m. that they came into my house. They gave out bonbons and gifts to the children, and told us not to be afraid,” said Hamidou Sissouma, a 48-year-old schoolteacher, pulling out a short, gray-colored string of prayer beads they had given him. “Then they made themselves tea. They used my bucket to wash themselves. … I was afraid, so I left and went to stay with friends.”

Within hours, French jets arrived and bombed five rebel vehicles parked in the open, leaving only their charred shells. By Tuesday, the Islamists were looking for cover for their fleet of about 30 to 40 all-terrain vehicles.

When Sissouma returned to his house, he found they had rammed a pickup truck into the wall of his compound, punching a hole large enough to drive two 4-by-4’s into his courtyard. They promised to reimburse him for the damage.

The men at Sissouma’s house reported to a light-skinned Arabic-speaking man, whose unit also took over the home of a neighbor, Mohamed Sanogo. Both houses seem to have been chosen for their bountiful mango trees. The men parked their cars so close to a tree in Sanogo’s yard that they shaved off a lower branch, Sanogo said, showing the scarred, freshly-cut stump. He said they collected dirt, added water and painted their vehicles with mud, further camouflaging them.

When Kone came over to Sanogo’s house on Wednesday, he stumbled upon the uninvited houseguests. He immediately turned to leave. The short, light-skinned man who appeared to be their leader waved him in, telling him not to be afraid. “Do you know who I am?” the man asked. His white beard pointed out from his chin in a scruffy goatee, and he spoke only a smattering of French, using Arabic with his guards.

When Kone said no, the commander told him to go watch the evening news. Then, changing his mind, he declared: “I am Abou Zeid.”

Roughly a dozen other residents confirmed that the man occupying the house had identified himself as Abou Zeid, and their description matches the few photographs that exist of the man described by the Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations as “the most violent and radical” of the leaders of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.

Born in southern Algeria, the 50-something jihadist has operated in Mali since at least 2003, and is behind dozens of kidnappings of European aid workers and tourists, each of whom earned him an estimated $2 to $3 million, according to Stratfor, an intelligence gathering unit. He is known for his fanaticism and deep-seated hatred of the West, has executed several hostages and is the subject of United Nations sanctions due to his association with al-Qaida.

In Diabaly, he exuded authority, residents say, and fighters approached him with deference, speaking in a lowered voice, almost a whisper, as if addressing a priest. He spent the daylight hours sitting on a mat in the shade reading the Quran. At all times, he was flanked by at a minimum five guards, and at least one stood sentinel at night when Abou Zeid slept.

The rebels were traveling with boxes of unperishable food imported from Algeria, Abou Zeid‘s birthplace. He left behind several discarded macaroni packets made by a brand headquartered in Algeria, according to the label, along with packages of Algerian powdered milk on the floor of the room where he slept.

Although Diabaly residents were terrified by the fighters, and many came out to cheer the French, they said the Islamists had gone to lengths to show respect.

When fighters entered the compound next to Sidi Toure‘s, they addressed Toure over the shared wall between the two homes. His neighbors had fled.

“They explained that they wanted to take over my neighbor’s house, and said they were willing to pay rent,” he said. “Even for the water that they took from our well, they offered to pay.”

Toure said he told them he did not need their money and would rather they leave, and they said they would not stay long.

The room they used to stock their arms is now empty, except for a few cardboard boxes and a former ammunition crate. What they forgot to take was a notebook, where they started writing in the ledger from the back page to the front, as is customary in Arabic.

The first page of writing begins with an inventory of weapons: “One 60 mm mortar, One Toshka machine gun, Three machine guns, Four Dabekterbov machine guns without a magazine, One armored Bika, 16 Chinese Kalashnikov rifles without magazines, 21 Sardinia 23, 26 RPG shells …” in a list that reads like the ingredients for a Soviet-era war.

As the French air strikes intensified, the fighters blended in more and more with the population, said witnesses. They no longer drove their cars, borrowing scooters from locals. And they timed their movements to match those of the civilians they knew France would not bomb.

“When the population is outside, they are outside,” said Kone. “When the population is indoors, they are indoors.”

The French managed to bomb with remarkable precision. When they took out five cars parked just yards from the home of Adama Nantoume, they did not harm his family or damage his home.

“The explosions were so loud that for a while I thought I had gone deaf,” Nantoume said. “I was suffocated by the smoke. And the light burned my eyes. The gas made me cry. … But I was not hurt.”

As Diabaly began to empty out, the Islamists set up roadblocks to prevent civilians from leaving, according to locals whose families and friends were turned back. Many made it out anyway, cutting across the rice fields in an area they had left unpatrolled.

Then, as suddenly as they had arrived, the Islamists left on Thursday. As they went, residents said, they saw cars that looked like moving bushes because they had so much foliage attached to them.

It was another four days before the French declared the area safe to enter.

As of Monday, life in Diabaly appeared to have gone back to normal. Women gave their children bucket baths and washed their pots and pans in the irrigation canal running along one side of the town. The families whose properties had been occupied by the Islamists were starting to clean up the trash they left behind.

One of the few things the Islamists stole, residents said, was a Canal+ cable television decoder. They wanted access to French channels to learn what the French thought of their insurgent tactics.

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Associated Press writers Baba Ahmed in Diabaly, Mali and Jamey Keaten in Dakar, Senegal, contributed to this report.

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Algeria terror leader preferred money to death

Moktar Belmoktar is known abroad as the man who orchestrated the abduction of scores of foreigners last week at a BP-operated plant in the remote, eastern corner of Algeria, in a raid that led to many of their deaths.

In the Sahara at least up until this week he was, ironically, known as the more pragmatic and less brutal of the commanders of an increasingly successful offshoot of al-Qaida. The question now is has he evolved into an international terrorist every bit as violent his rivals, or did the Algeria operation go very differently than he intended?

Belmoktar, a 41-year-old Algerian known in Pentagon circles as “MBM,” just split off from al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, to start his own franchise.

Over the past decade, AQIM has kidnapped dozens of foreigners, including diplomats, aid workers, field doctors and tourists. Although Belmoktar‘s hostages are forced to endure months of privation and live with the constant threat of execution, those who have dealt directly with him say his cell has never executed a captive, according to hostage negotiators, a courier sent to collect proof-of-life videos, senior diplomats and security experts interviewed for this article.

The notable exception was the 2011 kidnapping of two French nationals from a bar in the capital of Niger, both of whom were killed when the French military tried to rescue them. It’s unclear if the two died from friendly fire, or were executed by their captors in a situation that closely mirrors the chain of events in Algeria, where combat helicopters strafed the compound in an effort to liberate the hostages, killing both kidnappers and victims.

Belmoktar prefers to trade his hostages for money, experts have said, and global intelligence unit Stratfor says he can get an estimated $3 million per European captive. The money allowed him to build one of the best-financed arms of AQIM. It may explain how he was able to strike out on his own six weeks ago to create “The Masked Brigade,” whose inaugural attack was launched inside Algeria.

MBM is more along the lines of, how do I negotiate and put extra money in my pocket?” says Rudolph Atallah, the former head of counterterrorism for Africa at the Pentagon, who has spent years tracking the terror network in this Sahelian country. “The others are purists.”

Belmoktar is a contrast to his more ruthless colleague, Abou Zeid, who beheaded a British national and executed a 78-year-old Frenchman in 2010 in retaliation for a raid attempting to save him that killed six militants.

Up until December of last year, both men were emirs of their own “katiba,” or brigade, in AQIM. Though they are both from southern Algeria, they have chosen to embed themselves in northern Mali, in the immense, ungoverned desert which ranges from feather-soft dunes to flat, rocky plains. And both have made tens of millions of dollars by kidnapping French, Canadian, Spanish, Swiss, German, English and Italian nationals.

The contrast between the two is captured in the recently published memoir of Robert Fowler, a Canadian diplomat who was kidnapped by Belmoktar in 2008 in Niger, where he had been sent as a United Nations special envoy. Fowler was tied up and shoved into a pickup truck and the blows he suffered as his body was banged against the metal during the multi-day journey to Mali caused a compression fracture in a vertebra.

Fowler’s ordeal could have been much worse. He describes how on April 21, 2008, he was driven to a rendezvous point. The same day, Abou Zeid‘s troops arrived with two women, one of them on the point of death.

Belmoktar went to inspect the women, and returned to where Fowler was sitting with a “thunderous look on his face,” he wrote. Belmoktar asked to be passed dysentery pills from the medical kit, and ran back to give them to 77-year-old Marianne Petzold, a retired German teacher, and Swiss national Gabriella Burco Greiner.

When Fowler saw the two “the shock was physical. I recoiled with horror at the sight of those small, troubled white faces, twisted with pain.”

One had been bitten by a scorpion, and her arm had ballooned and turned black. She would later spend six weeks in the hospital getting skin grafts to replace the necrotized flesh, he writes in “A Season in Hell.” They both suffered from dysentery, and Abou Zeid had refused to give them the medicine that their governments had sent during their negotiation. At the moment that they were supposed to be released, Abou Zeid decided that he was not ready to free them, and an argument ensued between him and Belmoktar.

The same man who masterminded the recent horror in Algeria last week was visibly disturbed, wrote Fowler. He said it was Belmoktar who intervened, overruling Abou Zeid to free the two, ordering the drivers to take off across the trackless desert.

“If you are kidnapped by Belmoktar you would most likely live — and you could not say the same thing for Abou Zeid: All the hostages killed between 2006 and 2012 were killed by Abou Zeid. You don’t want to be in a position of describing him as the ‘noble savage.’ But I do think his thought process is less distorted by ideology,” says Geoff Porter, founder of North Africa Risk Consulting, a political risk firm specializing in the Sahara region, who has tracked Belmoktar for years. “

However, long before this week’s attack in Algeria, Belmoktar had also shown brutality. His men attacked a military base in Mauritania in 2005, killing over a dozen soldiers, said Dakar, Senegal-based analyst Andrew Lebovitch. And he’s twice been sentenced to death in absentia in Algeria for the killing of customs officials and border guards, according to Abdel Bari Atwan‘s upcoming book “After Bin Laden.”

His trajectory up until last week was nearly identical to that of Abou Zeid. Like Abou Zeid, he joined the Armed Islamic Group, or GIA, an Algerian extremist organization which arose in the aftermath of the 1991 election, which was voided by the secular government after an Islamic party won. He then joined the GIA‘s offshoot, the GSPC, a group that carried out suicide bombings against Algerian government targets. In 2006, when the group became part of al-Qaida, changing its name to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, both Abou Zeid and Belmoktar became the head of individual brigades.

Belmoktar claims he trained in Afghanistan in the 1990s, including in one of Osama Bin Laden‘s camps. It was there that he reportedly lost an eye, earning him the nickname “Laaouar,” Arabic for ‘One-eyed.’ Research by the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation claims Belmoktar became the conduit between the core al-Qaida and AQIM.

But early on, there were signs that Belmoktar was not in step with the gratuitous violence that characterized both the GIA and the GSPC, as well as AQIM. A diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in Algiers quotes Algerian sources who say that at different times, Belmoktar denounced both GIA and AQIM tactics because they caused many civilian casualties.

Last December, after rumors of a growing rift with Abou Zeid, Belmoktar announced that he was leaving AQIM and creating his own group, “The Masked Brigade.” His close associate, Oumar Ould Hamaha, told the AP that Belmoktar wanted to create a pan-Saharan movement, and the North African chapter was too narrowly focused on countries in the Maghreb, or North Africa.

It came as the United Nations was getting ready to authorize a military intervention to take back Mali‘s north from Islamic extremists, including Belmoktar’s group. When France began airstrikes on Jan. 11, destroying a training camp, several weapons depots and a base known to be used by Belmoktar’s men in the northern Malian town of Gao, Hamaha raged that now their jihad would go “global.”

It was only a few days later in the tiny town of Ain Amenas in far eastern Algeria that turbaned men claiming allegiance to Belmoktar descended on a natural gas complex, operated in partnership with BP and took hundreds of hostages in the most ambitious terrorist operation the North Africa had ever seen. They forced the hostages to wear explosives. Belmoktar issued a statement saying the dozens of captives would be killed if France didn’t halt its military incursion in Mali.

No one will ever know what would have happened if Algeria or other governments agreed to negotiate. Instead, the Algerians sent in helicopters, pounding the compound, and in the bloodbath that ensued, at least 32 militants and 23 captives were killed, according to the Algerian government. It’s unclear how many were killed by friendly fire, and how many were executed by Belmoktar’s men.

One of the people that knows him best says these events in Algeria signal that Belmoktar has chosen to walk down the path of Abou Zeid.

Moustapha Chaffi has been the main hostage negotiator on many of the kidnappings carried out by both Belmoktar and Abou Zeid. It was he who was waiting to receive Fowler and the two women on April 21, 2008. He confirmed that Belmoktar ran to give them the dysentry pills, and later insisted they be released.

“Before he led this operation in Algeria, that was the sentiment I had, that Belmoktar was less brutal,” Chaffi said by telephone on Friday. “Now I find myself thinking that they are all terrorists. That they all take hostages. That they are all fanatics. So to draw a difference between them is really, really relative. There’s in fact no difference anymore.”

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Associated Press writer Jamey Keaten in Dakar, Senegal and Cassandra Vinograd in London contributed to this report.

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